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ADOPTION BY REFERENCE
Amicus Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints (hereinafter "the Church" or "the LDS Church") adopts by reference the following
sections of the parties' briefs, without taking sides on any disputed issues:
(1) Jurisdiction, (2) Statement of the Issues, (3) Determinative Constitutional and
Statutory Provisions, and (4) Statement of the Case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The liability limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 apply to churches and
many other institutions that are very different - legally and otherwise - than the foster
child placement agency at issue here. Churches, for example, enjoy constitutional
protections not available to other organizations. The First Amendment bars claims that
seek to hold churches liable for failing to prevent one church member from sexually
abusing another where the abuse is unrelated to any church function, property, or
position. With respect to churches, therefore, § 78-12-25.1 merely codifies important
liability limitations that already exist in the law.
The Savages contend that as applied to limit liability in their case § 78-12-25.1
violates Article I, § 11 (Open Courts Clause) and Article I, § 24 (Uniform Operation of
Laws Clause) of the Utah Constitution. The Church takes no position on the
constitutionality of § 78-12-25.1 as applied to the unique facts, circumstances, and claims
in this case. The narrow purpose of this amicus brief is to demonstrate that both the Open

1

Courts analysis and the Uniform Operation of Laws analysis are highly context specific.
A law limiting liability might well be unconstitutional under both provisions when
applied to the facts of one case, but perfectly constitutional in another case with very
different facts or legal considerations. Accordingly, this Court should carefully tailor its
holding to the specific circumstances and legal claims at issue here, leaving for another
day whether the statute is constitutional in other contexts.
ARGUMENT
I.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 Addresses a Serious Problem Facing Many
Churches and Other Voluntary Associations.
Churches and other voluntary associations are increasingly targeted by lawsuits

based on their alleged failure to affirmatively act to prevent one church member from
harming another, even where the harm is entirely unrelated to church activities, property,
or positions. In contrast to the more widely publicized child abuse lawsuits in which a
clergyman abuses a child in the congregation with the alleged knowledge of the church,
these less-publicized cases typically involve allegations that a simple member of the
church sexually abused a child in a home, neighborhood, or other non-church venue, and
that the church breached a purported duty to protect the child from the abuse. Under this
theory, churches become the insurers of their members' safety, at least with respect to
injuries caused by other members whom church leaders allegedly knew or should have
known might be dangerous. These lawsuits often seek awards in the millions or even
hundreds of millions of dollars.
2

Such lawsuits present serious problems for churches. By doctrine and disposition,
most churches are open and inviting to all who desire to attend and participate.
Membership is generally available for the asking. In the LDS Church, for example,
members of the public are welcome to attend Sunday meetings and many other activities.
Baptism and Church membership are freely granted. The Church requires only that a
person affirm belief in its central tenets, assert compliance with certain Church standards
of conduct, and desire baptism. Other churches have even fewer requirements. Indeed,
the theologies of many churches - such as various Protestant denominations - do not
envision any inquiry into the proselyte's personal conduct or past. Theologically, these
denominations believe such issues are solely between God and the person.
In this respect, a church is very different from a professional child care or child
placement organization with the means and structure to screen or even conduct
background checks on its members in order to weed out persons with troubled pasts. It is
the very purpose of churches to be a "hospital for sinners" and not a "club for the saved."
Given this, churches cannot guarantee the legality of their members' private conduct vis a
vis other members, nor function as investigative or police agencies over their
congregations. Even if that were an option theologically, as a practical matter churches
lack the resources to do so. As explained below, Utah law has never saddled churches
with such a duty, and to impose one would have far-reaching effects.

3

Nevertheless, plaintiffs continue to try to hold churches responsible for sexual
abuse inflicted by one member on another. For example, the LDS Church has been sued
on several occasions for allegedly failing to warn or protect members from abuse by other
mere members. In one Utah case, two plaintiffs (a mother and son) seek to hold the
Church liable because its local leaders allegedly failed to warn them of an abusive
member in their neighborhood. See Complaint, Doe et al v. Corporation of the President
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saiitts et ai, Civil No. 020904810 (3rd
Judicial District, Utah), currently on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (Case No.
20030511-CA). The plaintiffs allege that the perpetrator sexually abused the mother as a
teenager and then, about two decades later, abused her son. The abuse allegedly occurred
in and around the neighborhood; none of it was connected with any Church activity,
property, or calling. Making similar claims, the plaintiffs in a Washington case seek to
recover against the Church for sexual abuse perpetrated against them in the privacy of
their own home by their own step-father. See Complaint, Doe v. Corporation of the
President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, No. 02-2-0415-1 (Wash.
Co. Superior Court). And the plaintiffs in a pending Oregon case seek recovery against
the Church because they were abused by an unassuming 80-year old member who moved
into their neighborhood. See Complaint, B.B. v. Corporation of the President of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, No. 02-CV-80 (D. Or.).

4

By enacting Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1, the Utah Legislature precluded such
claims against churches, freeing them from the tremendous burden of litigating suits
based on their failure to prevent member-on-member child abuse. The legal and policy
concerns at issue with churches are very different from those in other contexts where
§ 78-12-25.1 might apply. The context of this case entails many different considerations
from those at issue when a church is being sued for member-on-member abuse. As
demonstrated next, that difference mandates an analysis here that is limited to the facts
and circumstances of this case, leaving open the question whether § 78-12-25.1 comports
with the Open Courts and Uniform Operation of Laws provisions as applied to churches
and other voluntary institutions.
II.

This Case Should Be Decided as an "As-Applied" Challenge That Does Not
Decide the Constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 on Its Face or in
Other Contexts.
On appeal, the Savages contend that if § 78-12-25.1 truly bars their claims (a point

they dispute), then it violates the Article I, § 11 (Open Courts Clause) of the Utah
Constitution. See Brief of Appellants ("Brf. Aplt"), pp. 20-23. As this Court has
recognized, a "statute may be unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the facts
of a given case. A facial challenge is the most difficult because it requires the challenger
to 'establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the [statute] would be valid5"
State of Utah v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, \ 4 n.2, 993 P.2d 854 {quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). "[F]acial challenges to legislation are generally

5

disfavored," FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990); whenever possible, the
law prefers as-applied challenges over facial challenges.1
This is doubly true for an Open Courts challenge. This Court's decisions make
clear that the focus of the analysis is on whether the specific individual - the "injured
person" {Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985)) - would have
had a claim in the first place and, if so, whether the alternative remedies available to the
person are "effective and reasonable." Id. As Chief Justice Durham, joined by Justices
Howe and Russon, stated in her opinion in Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center,
2002 UT 134, 67 ? 3d 436, petition for cert, filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3105 (U.S. Jul 11, 2003)
(No. 03-82), "regarding article I, section 11 rights, this court should examine in an
individualized inquiry whether a legislative enactment denies a litigant 'a remedy by due
course of law5 in order to determine whether article I, section 11 applies to the case at
hand." Id. Tf 50 (Durham, C.J., dissenting, joined by Howe, and Russon, JJ.; emphasis
added).2 This individualized approach is most consistent with this Court's interpretation

1

Throughout their brief, the Savages acknowledge that their Open Courts Clause
challenge is an as-applied one. Brf. Aplt. at 8 ("the statute, as applied, unconstitutionally
violates Utah's guarantee of open courts") (emphasis added); see also id. at 20 ("As
applied by the trial court, § 78-12-25.1 violates Utah's constitutional guarantee of open
courts."); id. at 23 ("Therefore, as applied by the trial court, § 78-12-25.1
unconstitutionally deprives the Savages of a claim for negligence against UYV in
violation of Utah's guarantee of open courts.").
2

Part I of Chief Justice Durham's dissenting opinion in Wood regarding the
appropriate standard of review "reflects the majority view on that issue." Id. *[ 41
(Durham, C.J., dissenting).
6

of the rights guaranteed under the Open Courts Clause as being part of the "specific
individual rights" in the Declaration of Rights section of the Utah Constitution. Id. ^f 43
(emphasis added).
Accordingly, it is standard for this Court to analyze Open Courts challenges as
as-applied - not facial - attacks on the statutes at issue. The language of this Court's
decisions repeatedly refers to the as-applied nature of such challenges.3 Whether or not a

3

Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1026-27 (Utah 2002) ("We therefore hold
that the 1987 amendment is unconstitutional as it applies to municipalities operating
electrical power systems
We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the
amendment as applied to other municipal activities since a lower standard of care may
apply and different considerations may be relevant.") (emphasis added); Jensen v. State
Tax Commission, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992) ("The requirement that [taxpayers]
deposit the full amount of the deficiency assessed by the Commission is, on the facts of
this case, an effective bar to judicial review. Thus, to the extent that Sec. 59-1-505
precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the open courts provision and is
unconstitutional as applied. We make clear, however, that the statutory requirement is not
unconstitutional in all cases. When a taxpayer is able to meet the requirement, the deposit
must be paid.") (emphasis added); Maiyboy v. Utah Tax Commission, 904 P.2d 662, 67071 (Utah 1995) ("Unlike the petitioners in Jensen, the Maryboys were financially able to
pay the $10,855.38 deficiency. Although the requirement in Sec. 59-1-505
inconvenienced them, it did not deny them reasonable access to judicial review. As we
made clear in Jensen, Sec. 59-1-505 'is not unconstitutional in all cases. When a taxpayer
is able to meet the requirement, the deposit must be paid.' 835 P.2d at 969. This is just
such a case."); McCorvey v. Utah State Dept Of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993)
("We find no constitutional infirmity with the [Governmental Immunity] Act as applied to
the facts of this case.") (emphasis added); Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d
348 (Utah 1989) ("[T]he holding of the Court [on the Open Courts issue] is limited to the
following: the recovery limits statutes are unconstitutional as applied to University
Hospital.") (emphasis added); Avis v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 837
P.2d 585, 588 (Utah 1992) ("We further conclude that the [Worker's Compensation
Statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99] as applied to petitioner does not violate
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution because he knew of his injury within
the limitations period.") (emphasis added).
7

statute survives application in a particular case turns on the particular facts of that case.
Indeed, given that § 78-12-25.1 covers numerous potential causes of action, innumerable
factual scenarios, and many different types of defendants with potentially differing legal
duties, a facial challenge proving that the statute is unconstitutional in every context
might well be impossible.
An excellent example of a situation where § 78-12-25.1 is most likely
constitutional can be found in the context of claims against churches for failure to prevent
child sexual abuse by one member against another. Where no church function, property,
or official calling is involved, no court has ever held that a church has a duty to protect
members from the private misconduct of others. To the contrary, this and other courts
have expressly held that churches do not owe these types of affirmative duties to their
members because of the First Amendment problems they would create:
Defining such a duty would necessarily require a court to express the
standard of care to be followed by other reasonable clerics in the
performance of their ecclesiastical counseling duties which, by its very
nature, would embroil the courts in establishing the training, skill, and
standards applicable for members of the clergy in this state in a diversity of
religions professing widely varying beliefs. This is as impossible as it is
unconstitutional; to do so would foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, \ 23, 21 P.3d
198; see also Biyan R. v. Watchtower v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 738 A.2d
839, 847 (Me. 1999) (rejecting imposition of duty on church to protect one church
member from sexual abuse by another member: "The creation of an amorphous common
8

law duty on the part of a church or other voluntary organization requiring it to protect its
members from each other would give rise to 'both unlimited liability and liability out of
all proportion to culpability/") (citation omitted).
Of course, this case does not present the issue of whether churches have - or
constitutionally could have - special common law duties to prevent, protect against, or
report child sexual abuse, and there is certainly no need for this Court to address that
issue in this case. The point here is simply that regardless of the merits of the Savages'
position, there are powerful arguments that § 78-12-25.1 is perfectly constitutional in
other contexts, precluding facial invalidation of the statute.
III.

The Savages5 Uniform Operation of Laws Arguments Should Likewise Be
Considered an "As-Applied" Challenge That Does Not Decide the
Constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 on Its Face or in Other
Contexts.
The Savages also contend that to the extent § 78-12-25.1 bars their claims it

further violates Article I, § 24 (Uniform Operation of Laws Clause) of the Utah
Constitution. See Brf. Aplt., pp. 23-25. For many of the same reasons as those stated
above, this argument should also be subjected to an as-applied analysis.
As with their Open Courts arguments, the Savages have expressly denominated
their § 24 challenge to § 78-12-25.1 as an as-applied attack and not as an attempt to
invalidate the statute under all circumstances. See Brf. Aplt, pp. 23, 25 ("as applied" the
statute violates § 24). More substantively, the Savages' § 24 challenge should be
addressed in an as-applied setting because, depending on the facts and claims at issue, the
9

appropriate level of judicial scrutiny in this case might well be very different than in other
potential cases challenging § 78-12-25.1. "[T]he broad outlines of the analytical model
used in determining compliance with the uniform operation of laws provision remain the
same in all cases, [but] the level of scrutiny [the Court] give[s] legislative enactments
varies" depending on whether a fundamental right or suspect classification is at issue.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); see Ryan v.
Gold Cross Se?~vs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995).
An as-applied analysis under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause WLII generally
be required in situations where the Open Courts inquiry under different facts is capable of
producing different outcomes and thus different standards of judicial scrutiny, because
the degree of judicial scrutiny is often outcome determinative.4 That is precisely the
situation when § 78-12-25.1 is at issue. The Savages contend that the Open Courts
Clause guarantees them a legal remedy against the Utah Youth Village. If that turns out
to be true, then their § 24 challenge to § 78-12-25.1 might well require heightened
scrutiny, assuming they have properly defined the relevant class and that the statute

4

Such was the case in McCorvey v. Utah State Dept. Of Transportation, 868 P.2d
41 (Utah 1993). In McCorvey, this Court held "that there is no 'fundamental right' [under
the Open Courts Clause] to recover damages from government entities performing
governmental functions." Id. at 48 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) (summarizing
majority holding); see id. (majority opinion) (statute "does not infringe on a fundamental
right"). Based on that conclusion, the Court ruled that "therefore a heightened standard
of scrutiny is not applicable for determining the constitutionality" under § 24 of applying
the challenged statute to the facts of that case. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting;
emphasis added); see id. (majority opinion).
10

actually discriminates. See McCoiyey, 868 P.2d at 48. However, as outlined above, it is
most likely that the Open Courts Clause does not ensure a common law remedy against
churches for failure to prevent, warn against, or report member-on-member child abuse.
Thus, a § 24 challenge in a case involving a church would be subject to a very deferential
standard of review that would almost assuredly uphold the statute as applied to churches.
See Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, If 23, 48 P.3d 941 ("low threshold" applies
under § 24 in a case not involving fundamental rights or suspect classifications and
"statute has a strong presumption of constitutionality, with doubts resolved in favor of its
constitutionality") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). After all, it can hardly
be a violation of § 24 if a statute specifically precludes a class of persons from obtaining a
remedy that doesn't even exist - for anyone - in the first place.
The fact that § 78-12-25.1 could be constitutional under § 24 in the context of
churches necessarily precludes a successful facial challenge here. The Savages' Uniform
Operation of Laws arguments should be expressly adjudicated as an as-applied challenge.

11

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Savages' objections to Utah Code Ann. § 78-1225.1 based on Article I, §§ 11 & 24 should be considered as-applied and not facial
challenges. The Church takes no position on the constitutionality of § 78-12-25.1 as
applied to the facts and claims in this case.
Dated this U-

day of September, 2003.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

KEETeT
ALEXANDER DUSHKU
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Corporation of the President of The
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